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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF 
CONVICTIONS FOR TWO COUNTS OF SODOMY, A FIRST DEGREE 
FELONY, IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, UINTAH COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE CLARK L. MCLELLAN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
PREAMBLE 
Defendant-Appellant Abelardo Cruz ("Cruz") hereby files this reply brief in 
response to Appellee's brief of January 19, 2016. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c). 
The State essentially contends that 1) Cruz waived the right to challenge the 
trial court's Rule 15.5 findings of reliability of the videotaped interviews of MR 
because trial counsel told the court that he "did not care" about the court admitting 
the tapes [State's Brief at 14]; 2) Cruz's claim that allowing unconfronted 
1 
statements of MR to go with the jury into deliberations is misplaced because 
"confrontation" goes to admissibility of evidence rather than whether the jury 
could view the vtapes [ id. at 15, 3 3]; 3) Cruz has not shown that allowing the tapes 
in the jury room over-emphasized MR's testimony or, in the alternative, that 
admission of the tapes was not prejudicial because admitting them benefited Cruz 
more than hurt him [id. at 15, 37-38]; 4) Cruz affirmatively waived his right to 
challenge the trial court's curative instruction on the essence of MR's non-verbal 
responses to questions [id. at 17, 39-43]; 5) Cruz's trial counsel was not ineffective 
in joining the Allen instruction given by the trial court or, in the alternative, that the 
Allen charge was neither coercive nor prejudicial [id. at 17, 51-58]; 6) MR's 
videotaped statements to the interviewers and her mother's corrobation of the 
statements show sufficient evidence to convict Cruz of two sodomy counts [id. at 
18, 59-61]; and Cruz failed to show that cumulative error affected his trial because 
he did not even show that any error occurred [id. at 19, 62]. 
Cruz addresses the State's argument as follow: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. CRUZ DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, 
AND HE WAS PREJUDICED, BY THE COURT ALLOWING THE 
VIDEOTAPES OF MR'S INTERVIEWS TO GO TO THE JURY IN 
DELIBERATIONS. 
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The State argues that Cruz has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in 
allowing the videotapes of MR' s testimony to go into the jury room for 
deliberations. State's Brief at 15, 37-38. In fact, the State confidently posited that 
the admission of the videotapes "helped [Cruz] more than it hurt him." Id at 15. 
The State based this speculation on the fact that Cruz was convicted only on the 
November 9 conduct where MR' s mother allegedly walked in on Cruz laying down 
on the bed, with his pants unzipped. Id. at 3 8. 
While it is true that the jury hung on five of the eight counts against Cruz 
(State's Brief at 38, 45), it is quite a leap to then suggest, as the State does, that if 
any error exists 1in allowing the tapes into the deliberation room with the jury, it 
helped Cruz more than hurt him, and thus he cannot show prejudice. Id. at 37. To 
perfect this argument, the the State downplays the vigor of its repeated insistence 
that the jury must be allowed to take the tapes into the jury room for deliberation, 
from pretrial proceedings to trial. See, e.g., R.11 :356 (State explicitly arguing that 
the videotape must be allowed to go to the jury room just as dash cams ate allowed 
in DUI cases). The State then shifts the blame to trial counsel, arguing that during 
closing, the defense rather than the State wanted the tape played to the jury. See 
1 Cruz has adequately pointed out in his opening brief that the videotapes of MR' s 
statements should not have been allowed in the jury room under any 
circumstances. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 41--4 7. 
3 
State Brief at 3 7 ( citing R.13: 834 ). 2 
The issue of whether a district court may allow the jury to go into 
deliberations and re-play admitted videotapes was one of first impression at the 
time Cruz filed his opening brief. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 42. A month or so 
after his initial brief, this Court tangentially ruled on the issue in another case. See 
State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App. 167, ,147, 357 P.3d 554. This Court deemed 
2 Contrary to the State's assertion, the prosecutor at closing implored the jury to 
watch the videotapes. See R.13:852 {"I encourage you to review all the 
evidence."); R.11 :851 (the prosecutor telling the jury about how he made the 
decision to file charges based on the videotapes and concluding, "If you chose to 
review it."). Admittedly, trial counsel similarly implored the jury at closing to "go 
and watch th[e videotpaes]." R.11 :834. But this was after the trial court had made 
it abundantly clear to counsel, numerous times --pretrial and during trial -- that he 
was bent on sending the tapes with the jury for deliberations. See,e.g., Cruz's 
Opening Brief at 17-18 ( describing trial court's ruling on allowing the videotapes 
to go to the jury). In.other words, after being beaten down by the trial court on this. 
issue, and knowing that the jury would eventually watch the tapes, it makes perfect 
sense that defense counsel, in amelioration, would point to the aspect of the tapes 
that may be favorable. Nevertheless, ameliorating the impact of the videotapes is 
sine qua non under the circumstances, but such is not to be equated with "inviting 
an error," or the so-called defense "complicity" in allowing the tapes to go to the 
jury. See,e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 762-63, 120 S. Ct. 1851 
(2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ( citing multiple treatises for the proposition that a 
"party who has made an unsuccessful motion in limine to exclude evidence that he 
expects the proponent to offer may be able to first to offer that same evidence 
without waiving his claim of error;" and a party may "himself bring out evidence 
ruled admissible over his objection to minimize its effect without it constituting a 
waiver ofp.is objection." (citing 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 18, p. 836 (P. Tillers 
rev. 1983); McCormick on Evidence§ 55, at 246 (5th ed. 1999)). 
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submission of the videotape of the victim's CJC interviews harmless where the 
"record does not suggest that the jury actually played the DVD" in deliberation. 
Id. However, this Court declined to rule on whether allowing the videotape to go 
to the jury was erroneous. Id. at ,I 46. 
Here, the record undisputably shows that the jury went into deliberations 
with a DVD player and the videotapes ofMR's interviews provided to them by the 
trial court. See R.11 :353-356; R.13:853, 854, 857 ((trial court stating that "we 
know that these two videotapes have been pre-admitted and are going to be part of 
the evidence that the jury has to consider in deliberation."); ("You now have all the 
evidence."); ("you are also going to receive both of the interviews on the video"); 
(trial court inquiring about whether the DVD player and TV were actually in the 
jury room for the jurors to use)). The record further shows that the State, over 
defense strong objection, vigorously argued that the jury be allowed to watch the 
tapes. R.11 :355-356. In fact, the State made the analogy that admitting the 
videotapes is no different from admitting dash cams in DUI cases. Id. 
In Ashby, the trial court explicitly stated that it generally ("automatically") 
does not allow DVD players to go into the jury room unless the jurors asked for it. 
See id., 2015 UT App. 167, at ,147. This Court found that there is no indication 
that the trial court deviated from this practice. See id. at ,147-48. Ashby, therefore, 
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is easily distinguished from the instant case where the trial court painstakingly 
arranged for a TV and DVD player to go into the jury room before the jury 
requested it, and also implored the jury to take the tapes with them. Accordingly, it 
defies credulity for the State to now claim that the jury may not have played the 
DVD ofMR's videotaped interviews during deliberation. State Brief at 38. 
Rather, the more reasonable inference is that the jury actually played the tapes in 
deliberation because, unlike Ashby, the trial court provided all the necessary 
ingredients for the jury to watch the tapes. It is also reasonable to conclude that the 
jury employed the tapes to over-emphasize MR's testimony over all others and 
therefore convicted Cruz of sodomy. As such, the issue left open in Ashby, 
whether the trial court erroneously allowed the videotapes in the jury room for 
deliberation, is squarely before this Court, and the Court should rule favorably for 
Cruz. 
POINT II. CRUZ DID NOT WAIVE OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION THAT THE JURY VIEW MR'S 
NONVERBAL RESPONSE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
The State posits that Cruz did not object to the trial court's instruction to the. 
jury to view MR's non-verbal response as an affirmative gesture in response to 
questions. State Brief at 17, 39. The State points to trial counsel's statement that 
6 
he did not object to the trial court's first suggestion to the jury to view the gesture 
as an affirmative response as indicating that counsel "affirmatively" waived any 
objection. Id. at 43. 
However, as detailed in Cruz's opening brief, "[r]ather than give a timely 
curative instruction, and notwithstanding counsel's strenuous objection, the district 
court acted as if nothing was wrong, proceeded with the trial unperturbed, only to 
then issue the curative instruction later in the trial when the State felt compelled to 
confess error. R.11 :441-94." Cruz's Opening Brief at 50. 
What the State neglected to point out to this Court was that trial counsel not 
only strenuously objected to the trial court's needless intervention, but also 
requested a curative instruction, which the trial court refused to give one on time. 
See Cruz's Opening Brief at 47-48. Rather, after being asked by trial counsel to 
cure its error "right then" and there, R.11 :447, the trial court proceeded with the 
trial unperturbed and only returned to give the curative instruction when the State 
joined trial counsel (by confessing error) in asking for one. Thus, as Cruz pointed 
out in his opening brief, the trial court's "curative instruction was neither prompt 
nor effective." Cruz's Opening Brief at 50. 
Accordingly, the State's attempt to shift the blame to trial counsel here -- by 
claiming that he somehow affirmatively waived any objection to the court's 
7 
needless instruction to view MR' s nonverbal gesture in particular way, or "invited" 
the error by remaining silent as the trial court committed this glaring error, State 
Brief at 43 -- is at best disingenuous. In sum, not only did trial counsel 
"strenuously" object to the trial court's instruction, he also challenged the timing of 
the curative instruction. See R.111:441-442. 
POINT III. CRUZ HAS SHOWN TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
INEFFECTIVENESS PREJUDICED HIM BY NOT OBJECTING TO THE 
COERCIVE ALLEN CHARGE. 
The State argues that the Allen charge given by the trial court was not 
coercive.3 State's Brief at 17, 48-51. In the alternative, the State contends that the 
fact that the jury did not conduct further deliberations after the trial court gave the 
instruction· and thereafter came back swiftly with a decision shows that the jury 
was not coerced, even if the instruction given by the court itself was coercive. 
State's Brief at 54. 
The State's argument is rather novel. The courts, however, have held that an 
Allen charge cannot urge anxiety on the part of the jury by "demanding a verdict," 
3 The State also takes Cruz to task for not providing a text of the Allen charge itself 
in his opening brief. See State's Brief at 55. But Cruz did not quibble with the 
Allen charge itself, and thus the text of the charge is not in dispute. Rather what 
Cruz objected to was the timing of the charge, coupled with the trial court's 
coercive language that it wanted a decision pronto. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 
52-54. 
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or by not appearing "even-handed." See,e.g., State v. Harry, 2008 UT App. 224, ,r 
9, 25, 189 P.3d 98. The crux of Cruz's argument here is that by stating it wanted a 
decision in short order, the trial court's instruction did exactly the impermissible --
urged a particular verdict. Coupled with this is the timing of the instruction, made 
before the jury announced it was deadlocked. This issue was adequately· briefed by 
Cruz. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 52-55. As such, this Court should hold that the 
Allen instruction here was ill-conceived and became more coercive when the trial 
court urged that a decision be forthcoming, in short order. 
POINT IV. CRUZ DEMONSTRATED THAT, EVEN VIEWED IN THE 
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY DETERMINATION, THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE SODOMY CONVICTIONS. 
The State argues that Cruz merely claims that the evidence he marshaled 
"undermines the conviction," and did not properly view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. State's Brief at 18, 59-60. The State then 
chronicled the evidence presented at trial as "constitut[ing]" reasonable inferences 
from which the requisite elements of the two sodomy convictions can be found." 
State's Brief at 69 (citing State v. Lucero, 2012 UT App. 202, ,r 2). 
The State. is clearly mistaken to the extent it claims that Cruz merely 
chronicled evidence "undermin[ing] the conviction." State Brief at 60. Cruz spent 
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no less than three pages discussing the evidence that could have supported the jury 
decision. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 56-59. He spent less time, however, 
describing evidence that undermined the jury decision. See id at 59-61. Cruz 
then argued that the State's case against him was neither overwhelming nor 
insurmountable because the jury acquitted him on one count and deadlocked on 
four others. Id. at 62 
Therefore, even though he was not required to "marshal" the evidence, Cruz 
did not minimize the evidence presented by the State that could have conceivably 
supported the jury decision. Rather, Cruz has shown that the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient inconclusive or 
inherently improbable to support the sodomy convictions, particularly given the 
trial court's erroneous Allen and curative instructions, both of which also swayed 
the jury towards conviction. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 62 ( citing State v. 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,146 ). 
POINT V. CRUZ HAS PATENTLY SHOWN CUMULATIVE ERROR 
AFFECTED HIS TRIAL. 
The State minimizes the numerous errors at trial, contending that Cruz has 
not shown that any error occurred at his trial, let alone that there was cumulative 
error or that he was prejudiced. State's Brief at 62. However, the errors Cruz 
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complained of are mostly of constitutional significance, and were not properly 
cured at trial by the district court, and may have even been magnified by the 
court's untimely and ineffective curative instruction. See Cruz's Opening Brief at 
62. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing and the arguments raised in his opening brief, Cruz 
respectfully request that this Court reverse the decision of the district court and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY DATED this 18th day of February, 2016. 
"~m !?!21._ o I 0 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
Attorney for Appellant Abelardo Cruz 
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